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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the German ﬁnancial system has provided few protections for
minority shareholders. Large blockholders, especially banks, exercise sig-
niﬁcant control over companies in Germany via direct ownership of ﬁrm equity
and proxy votes given to banks by their customers. At the same time that
blockholders have dominated German corporate governance, insider trading
has not been explicitly disallowed. Consequently, managers and blockholders
have had the opportunity to collude. In addition to earning trading proﬁts using
inside information, managers have been able to effectively bribe blockholders
by giving them inside information. The cost to shareholders is that
blockholders have little incentive to monitor the performance of managers.
Given that blockholders exercise such control, many researchers have argued
that the identity and number of voting rights held by controlling parties must
be disclosed [e.g. Becht (1997)]. In addition, other researchers have argued for
strict laws against insider trading in order to promote better investor protection
and conﬁdence in German ﬁnancial markets. It has only been in recent years,
however, that insider trading has been made illegal and German ﬁrms have
been required to disclose shareholdings above 5%. With the transposition of the
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95(89/592/EEC) Directives into the German legal code via the Wertpa-
pierhandelsgesetz (WpHG), which was passed July 26, 1994, listed companies
are now governed by additional disclosure rules and insider trading is now
illegal.
Despite these efforts to limit insider trading and improve ﬁnancial
transparency, many researchers have argued that the WpHG has been
ineffective in improving ﬁnancial transparency [e.g. Becht and Boehmer
(1999)] and reducing the costs of insider trading [e.g. Maug (1999)]. The
WpHG is viewed as being ineffective at improving ﬁnancial transparency
because the law is vague and allows for substantial delays in meeting disclosure
requirements. It is viewed as being ineffective at reducing the costs of insider
trading because it deﬁnes inside information narrowly, thus providing
incentives for blockholders to establish relationships with companies that are
close enough to extract information, but not so close that they are considered
insiders for the purpose of the WpHG. Consequently, there continues to be few
incentives for outside blockholders to monitor senior managers.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the effectiveness of the WpHG
by examining the stock price reaction to announcements associated with the
passage of the WpHG. We investigate the stock price reactions for the German
stock market as a whole to determine whether the passage of the WpHG
affected ﬁrm values in Germany. In addition, we investigate the stock price
reaction for individual companies in an effort to determine whether the market
response to the passage of the WpHG depends on individual ﬁrm character-
istics.
Our analysis adds evidence to what other researchers have argued. Our
analysis indicates that there was a positive and marginally signiﬁcant abnormal
return for German non-ﬁnancial companies on the date that the German
government proposed the WpHG, suggesting that market participants were
cautiously optimistic about the effectiveness of the WpHG. After long delays
and compromises on the details of the legislation, however, there was a
negative and statistically signiﬁcant abnormal return for German non-ﬁnancial
companies on the date the German Finance Committee approved the WpHG,
suggesting that market participants were ultimately disappointed in the ﬁnal
form of the legislation. This is consistent with the argument that the WpHG has
done little to improve ﬁnancial transparency and market integrity in Germany.
Additional evidence of this is found in our cross-sectional analysis of the
abnormal returns on the date the German Finance Committee approved the
legislation. In particular, our results indicate that those ﬁrms with the greatest
information asymmetries suffered the largest losses in ﬁrm value on this date.
This suggests that the WpHG has done little to improve the ﬂow of information
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WpHG may harm the ﬂow of information from insiders to outside investors by
restricting insiders’ ability to move prices by trading on inside information.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 describes the WpHG
and the related literature on ownership and control of companies and insider
trading in Germany. Section 3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4 describes the
data. Section 5 describes the methodology and presents the results. Finally,
Section 6 provides a summary and conclusions.
2. TRANSPARENCY AND INSIDER TRADING IN
GERMANY: REGULATORY ASPECTS
Traditionally, disclosure requirements for German companies have depended
on the legal form of incorporation. Listed companies are incorporated in the
form of an Aktiengesellschaft (AG). The laws and regulations governing these
AGs determine the amount of information these companies disclose and,
therefore, also the access that shareholders have to information about the
company. For AGs, these regulations include the commercial code (HGB), the
corporate code for AGs (AktG), and the antitrust code (GWB). Until recently,
there has been little difference in the disclosure requirements for listed AGs and
non-listed AGs.
As Table 1 shows, prior to 1995, disclosure of current ownership structure,
stakeholdings, or executive compensation by listed companies only took place
in exceptional circumstances (e.g. when a single entity acquired more that 25%
of an AG’s equity). As Becht and Boehmer (1999) state “Although German law
makes a number of provisions for the disclosure of ownership information and
German cartel and business group law imposes disclosure requirements for
control, the issues of ownership and control have traditionally been regarded as
private, sensitive, and not for the eyes of the general public.”
Given this attitude about information disclosure in Germany, it is not
surprising that insiders have traditionally been able to make proﬁtable trades
using inside information. Germany, however, is no exception in this respect.
European  ﬁnancial markets in general do not have a strong record of
preventing, controlling, or punishing insider trading. As Pitt and Hardison
(1992) point out, among the EU member states, only Denmark, France, and the
U.K. forbade insider trading in 1986.
The ﬁrst attempt to curtail insider trading took place in November 1970
when Germany introduced the Voluntary Insider Trading Guidelines and the
Broker and Investment Advisor Rules. As the names indicate, these rules were
voluntary and required that potential insiders such as a company’s manager
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Disclosure Requirements Regulation
The AG must deposit the current company statues publicly in the company
register.
The AG’s annual accounts must be made available to the public. §325–329 HGB
A list of the founding members must be publicly deposited. §39 AktG
A list of the current owners must not be made public except in the following
cases:
• When all shares are owned by one owner, the owner has to register name,
profession, and address.
§42 AktG
• If an owner’s stake in the AG exceeds 25% of the AG’s capital and if this
owner is a company, the AG has to disclose the owner’s stake in its annual
accounts by indicating whether the stake exceeds 25% or 50%.
Additionally, the AG has to disclose whether it holds at least 25% of the
owner’s company capital – It is the owner’s obligation to inform the AG of
such a stake and the information has to be published immediately in a
ﬁnancial newspaper.
§20, 160 AktG
• Each shareholder attending the annual general meeting is registered. This
attendance list is public and added to the company register. (Note that only
attending shareholders are registered. Shareholders voting by proxy are not
registered.)
§129 AktG
• Stake purchases leading to ownership of more than 25% or 50% must be
ﬁled and approved by the Bundeskartellamt (BKartA). Upon approval, this
information becomes public.
§23 GWB
A list of the AG’s stakeholdings must not be made public except in the
following cases:
• If the AG’s stake in the target exceeds 20% of the target’s capital, the AG
must include in its annual accounts the percentage stake in the targeted
ﬁrm, the target’s nominal capital, and the target’s proﬁt. No reporting is
required if the stake has only a minor effect on the AG’s ﬁnancial status or
if disclosure could harm one of the two companies.
§285–286 HGB
• Stake purchases leading to ownership of more than 25% or 50% must be
ﬁled and approved by the Bundeskartellamt (BKartA). Upon approval, this
information becomes public.
§23 GWB
The repurchase of own shares must not be disclosed except in the following
cases:
• Disclosure of repurchase to avoid substantial and imminent damages to the
company, to issue shares to employees, or to pay a consideration associated
with a takeover or similar transaction.
§71 AktG
• All own holdings must be listed in the annual ﬁnancial statements and must
never exceed 10% of nominal capital.
§160 AktG
Limited disclosure of executive compensation is required:
• Aggregate compensation for the management board and for the supervisory
board separately must be disclosed in the annual accounts.
§285 HGB
• AGs do not have to disclose this information if it would allow shareholders
to identify compensation of individual board members.
§286 AktG
Source: Selected information from Becht and Boehmer (1999), tables 3 to 6.
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1 Standen (1995) discusses
these guidelines in detail and argues that the effect of the guidelines was
weakened even further as they did not contain any clear deﬁnitions or any
speciﬁc legal or disciplinary sanctions. Only primary insiders such as
supervisory board members, the company’s legal representatives and afﬁliates,
shareholders holding more than 25% of the company’s stock, or banks and
bank employees, were subject to the guidelines. Secondary insiders were not
covered. Also, the deﬁnition of what constitutes inside information – even if
broad at ﬁrst – was limited by the listing of speciﬁc examples of the term
‘knowledge’ contained in the deﬁnition of insider information as “knowledge
not yet disclosed or publicly known which could affect the valuation of the
Insider Securities”. Standen concludes, “the few teeth provided by the
deﬁnition in the Guidelines are dulled by a host of limitations and exceptions”.
The task of investigating insider trading fell historically to the Boards of
Inquiry of the stock exchanges but they could only instigate an investigation
after the ﬁling of a written and signed complaint. Regarding possible penalties
and sanctions, an inside trader who signed a compliance contract would have
to repay the proﬁts made from the inside trade. No other sanctions could be
imposed.
Additionally, from 1987 to 1994 §44a Börsengesetz (Stock Exchange Act)
contained a regulation comparable to the ad-hoc publicity requirements of §15
WpHG. However, these requirements had little effect. According to the
Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel (BAWe) in its 1995 annual
report, “This regulation has however not been sufﬁciently observed.”
2
Due to this lack of effective insider trading regulation, Germany has a history
of insider trading violations that went unpunished. Standen (1995) reviews
several of these cases that took place before insider trading became illegal. One
of these cases involved Merk, Finck & Co in July 1994. Even though it was
discovered by the prosecutors ofﬁce that Merk, Finck & Co had been involved
in front running, an activity by which traders buy stock of companies for which
they know that large buy orders are pending, the only penalty imposed was that
of tax evasion as the proﬁts from the trades had not been reported. As the
insider trading section of the WpHG did not come into effect until August 1,
1994, no further penalty could be imposed.
2.1. Transposition of European Union Insider Trading and Transparency
Directives
The lack of adequate disclosure requirements and insider trading laws in
Germany and other member states of the European Union (EU) prompted the
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Transparency Directive, which was agreed to in 1988 by the EU member states,
established minimum disclosure requirements for publicly traded ﬁrms. The
Directive further stipulated that member states were to implement these
disclosure requirements by the beginning of 1991. The Insider Trading
Directive, which was agreed to in 1989 and called for member state
implementation by June 1, 1992, is intended to make insider trading illegal and
provide for the public disclosure of price-sensitive information to investors.
In Germany, neither directive was transposed on time. Regarding the insider
trading directive, Germany was one of only two states that did not meet the
deadline. Standen (1995) claims that Germany’s strong banking lobby was
partly responsible for this delay. The directives were ﬁnally transposed into
German law when the Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz was signed into
law on July 26, 1994. This legislation included the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz
(WpHG),
3 which in turn established the Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpa-
pierhandel (BAWe), the securities trading commission, as the competent
authority for implementing the WpHG.
The WpHG became effective in two parts: The prohibition of insider trading
became effective on August 1, 1994 whereas the remaining parts of the WpHG
became effective on January 1, 1995. On this date, the BAWe also started
operating. The BAWe’s objectives can be categorized into three areas:
4 investor
protection, market integrity, and market transparency. In particular, the BAWe
improves investor protection by monitoring the conduct and rules compliance
of investment services ﬁrms and by being the central depository for
prospectuses. In order to achieve market integrity, the BAWe engages in
combating and preventing insider dealing, and monitoring the compliance with
§9 WpHG reporting requirements relating to all transactions in securities and
derivatives. Finally, the BAWe monitors the ad hoc disclosure requirements and
the voting rights disclosure requirements of listed ﬁrms in an effort to improve
market transparency.
Table 2 provides an overview of the requirements under the latest version of
the WpHG (as of September 9, 1998), which includes changes based on the
Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG), the
law for control and transparency in the corporate sector, which was passed May
1, 1998. As the WpHG has undergone several changes and consequently
inﬂuenced the competence of the BAWe, Table 3 provides additional
information about the chronology of the WpHG.
Comparing Tables 1 and 2 indicates a signiﬁcant increase in disclosure
requirements with the passage and implementation of the WpHG. Regarding
voting rights, the reporting thresholds have been lowered and apply to
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required when an owner’s stake exceeded 25%. The WpHG lowered the
reporting threshold to 5%. In addition, the WpHG requires disclosure when an
owner’s stake reaches, exceeds, or falls below 5, 10, 25, 50, or 75%.
Regarding insider trading, the BAWe sees its task as both combating and
preventing insider trading. Insider securities are all securities traded on any
organized market in the EU. Insiders include both primary and secondary
insiders described “as persons who, due to their function or by any other way,
Table 2. Disclosure Requirements under the WpHG
Market integrity: §9 reporting requirement
All trades have to be reported within one business-day of the conclusion of
the trade to the BAWe by the ﬁnancial institution executing the trade.
Disclosure details include a description of the security or derivative and
securities identiﬁcation number; date and time of the transaction or the
relevant price determination; price, number and face value of the securities
or derivatives; the institutions and enterprises which were involved in the
transaction; the stock exchange or the stock exchange’s electronic trading
system; if the transaction is concluded on a stock exchange; a marker to
identify the transaction. Furthermore, trades for customers and trades on
own account are reported separately. Note that for customer-transactions,
the customer name does not have to be identiﬁed.
§9WpHG
Market transparency: Ad hoc publicity
The issuers of a security has to immediately report any information that
can have an effect on the security’s price or – in case of debt securities –
reduce the ability to repay and that is not publicly available. The issuer has
to report this information to the BAWe and to the exchanges on which the
securities are traded.
§15 WpHG
Market transparency: Disclosure of major shareholdings
Natural and legal persons who reach, exceed or fall below one of the
thresholds of 5, 10, 25, 50 or 75% in the share capital of an ofﬁcially listed
company are required to notify the BAWe and the company of their
holdings of voting rights. This notiﬁcation must be made immediately, i.e.
within seven calendar days. The notifying party must state in particular the
respective threshold, the exact size of the percentage of the voting rights,
and the date on which the threshold has been reached, exceeded or fallen
below. – In turn, the listed company is required to inform the public
immediately, i.e. within nine days, of the change in its ownership structure
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clearly exceeds the insider deﬁnition of the EU guidelines by including
secondary insiders. Forbidden insider trading includes any activity that
involves the exploitation of insider facts (Tatsachen) for the insider him/herself,
or for third parties. Furthermore, primary insiders cannot pass on inside
information to others. Standen (1995) points out that the WpHG is very speciﬁc
in referring to facts rather than assessments (Bewertungen). Thus, assessments
arising most commonly from investment analysis are not considered inside
information.
Table 3. Events associated with the transposition of the Transparency
Directive in Germany
Panel A: Implementation and major amendments of the WpHG
BGBl date
1 Description
July 26, 1994 WpHG was passed in order to transpose the Transparency Directive.
WpHG passed 26.07.94, effective August 1, 1994 (insider trading only) and
January 1, 1995.
Dec 18, 1995 §15 WpHG changed: The BAWe may allow foreign issuers to publish their
ad hoc notiﬁcations in a language other than German.
June 18, 1997 §18, 40 WpHG changed: More comprehensive requirements for courts and
prosecuting authorities to provide the BAWe with information when
instituting criminal proceedings against owners or managers of investment
services ﬁrms, their legal representatives or personally liable partners.
Effective June 1, 1998.
Oct 22, 1997 New or broader deﬁnitions including an extension of the group of
companies, which are subject to supervision by the BAWe. Effective
January 1, 1998.
Mar 24, 1998 Changes in WpHG due to Drittes Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz including
increased authority of the BAWe under the new regulation including:
BAWe now has approval authority for prospectuses rather than just being
depository, BAWe has increased authority to obtain information of
suspected insider trades. Alignment of AktG to ﬁt the publication
requirement of the WpHG regarding disclosure of major shareholdings.
Effective April 1, 1998.
Apr 27, 1998 §21, 25 WpHG changed due to KonTraG: Publication requirements of
exchange-listed German companies relating to changes in holdings of
voting rights in case of share buybacks/sale of own shares. KonTraG
becomes effective May 1, 1998.
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Market Integrity: Insider trading and §9 reporting
requirement
Regulation to deﬁne trading disclosure requirement
according to §9 WpHG more speciﬁcally regarding
content and electronic transmission. Regulation
submitted for approval November 23, 1995, approved
December 21, 1995, text of regulation published
December 30, 1995, regulation effective January 1,
1996.
Aug 6, 1996 draft guideline
distributed
Investor protection: Rules of conduct
The BAWe has on August 5, 1996 sent out its draft
guideline, which speciﬁes the rules of conduct
according to §31–32 WpHG. The ﬁnancial industry
as well as the associations for customer protection
will be given the opportunity to comment on the draft
until August 28. The hearing will take place on
September 12, 1996; the guideline is expected to be
ﬁnally issued in autumn.
Dec 13, 1996 voting right
publication
Market Transparency: Disclosure of major
shareholdings
The BAWe will publish on December 18, 1996 a
report entitled “Major holdings of voting rights in
ofﬁcially listed companies as per 30 September
1996”. This the ﬁrst time that exact ﬁgures about the
ownership and control structures are made public.
June 3, 1997 guideline
published
Investor protection: Rules of conduct
The BAWe has today published its guideline on the
details concerning the rules of conduct according to
§31–32 WpHG relating to the commissions, ﬁxed
price and agency business.
Aug 1, 1997 voting right
publication via
www
Market Transparency: Disclosure of major
shareholdings
BAWe will publish voting rights via www starting
August 1, 1997
Source: Panel A is based on the chronology of the WpHG and panel B is based on the BAWe’s
new announcements as found on http://www.BAWe.de/
1 BGBl date=date of publication in the Federal Law Gazette
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insider transactions, §9 WpHG requires reporting of all security transactions as
described in Table 2. Currently, the BAWe has to review on average 855,000
reports on a daily basis. Needless to say that any efﬁcient and effective analysis
is only possible with computer technology. As Table 3 shows, these reporting
requirements were one of the elements of the WpHG, which were not applied
in practice immediately after the adoption of the WpHG but only on January 1,
1995. As with other parts of the WpHG, the BAWe had to specify the WpHG
by means of an ordinance (Verordnung).
Also note that the reporting banks only distinguish between customer and
own-account transactions. The name of the customer does not have to be
disclosed. Only in cases of suspected insider trading does the BAWe have the
right to require the reporting ﬁnancial institutions to provide more complete
information including the identity of the client and securities transactions
records of the client during the six months prior to the suspected insider trading
activities. If the BAWe’s investigation conﬁrms the suspicion of insider trading,
criminal prosecution then lies in the hands of the public prosecutor’s ofﬁce.
In order to prevent insider trading and encourage ﬁnancial transparency, the
WpHG requires the ad hoc disclosure of all facts that are not available to the
public but that could potentially signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the price of a security.
Furthermore, shareholders are required to notify the BAWe and to publish
changes in major holdings of voting rights. As the BAWe argues, these
measures prevent insider trading “because information that has already been
made available to the public can no longer be misused to carry out insider
transactions”. Finally, the codes of conduct established by the WpHG prevent
insider trading if companies adapt their organization by limiting the number of
employees who have access to inside information.
2.2. Analysis of the WpHG and BAWe
Although the recent changes in the German corporate governance system
appear to represent improvements, several observers have argued that the new
requirements are ineffective in improving investor protections in Germany.
With respect to the most recent regulation, the KonTraG of May 1998, Balz
(1999) argues that “it becomes obvious that, rightly or wrongly, the basic legal
structures of corporate governance have not been touched fundamentally. This
holds especially for the coalition model of . . . codetermination and of the
strong focus on averting creditor risk instead of maximizing shareholder value
inherent in the German company law.” Baums (1999) argues along similar lines
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two-tier system or codetermination) would be up for discussion. Therefore, the
KonTraG provides modest changes in details and does not mean a complete
overhaul.” Baums goes on to argue, however, that the KonTraG does aim –
among other things – to strengthen the shareholders’ position and improve
transparency.
Becht and Boehmer (1999) provide a detailed review and assessment of the
WpHG with respect to its disclosure requirements for changes in voting rights.
They criticize the fact that even if the WpHG calls for “immediate” publication,
it might take up to 16 days in practice until the information reaches the public.
This is due to the fact that §21 (1) WpHG allows up to 7 days to pass until the
shareholder has to inform the issuer and §25 (1) WpHG allows up to 9 days for
the issuer to publish the information. Within this time, the shareholder could
have signiﬁcantly changed his holding and the information is thus irrelevant by
the time it reaches the market. Furthermore, third parties involved in the
disclosure process could have used the inside information. Thus, Becht and
Boehmer conclude that “since this unacceptable delay has been implemented
by the transposition of the EU directive, a revision of the law would be required
to modify current procedures.”
Additionally it is not clear how the information is disseminated as no
newspaper has been speciﬁed. The BAWe itself does not publish the original
notiﬁcations immediately but provides on its www-site an updated summary of
the most current voting right structure on the 1st and 15th of every month. Our
analysis of the BAWe voting right databank for the purpose of this study
revealed that some data is missing in the database. For example, if a
shareholder reduces his position in a company such that his voting rights fall
below the minimum level for which reporting is required, the BAWe simply
drops this shareholder from the database. It is thus not possible to identify the
exact date when the decrease in voting rights took place. Becht and Boehmer
(1999) argue that “If the BAWe would decide to publish the original
notiﬁcations that it receives, transparency would be enhanced considerably by
providing full information within a potentially much shorter time span. . . .
[G]iven the current resource allocation by the German parliament, it is unlikely
that such an improvement is within reach.”
Regarding the content of the voting right notiﬁcations, Becht and Boehmer
(1999) point out further shortcomings of the regulation: proxy votes held by
banks do not have to be reported, controlling owners of investment companies
do not have to notify, and votes are not always attributed to their ﬁnal owners
because only the ﬁrst level of owners is reported in most circumstances. Due
to these shortcomings the true control structure is not always revealed under the
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remains a fact that transparency in Germany is lacking when compared to other
countries, regulators, and markets.”
Regarding insider trading, Standen (1995) evaluates the insider trading
regulation in Germany as follows: “The fact that insider trading regulations will
have any legal force marks a dramatic turning point in Germany’s treatment of
the offence. Yet the proposed German regulation is not perfect. Secondary
insiders are not prohibited from passing on inside information or making
recommendations thereon. The act is armed with criminal sanctions but does
not provide for civil liability. Banks may face some new reporting requirements
but have generally managed to maintain their veil of secrecy. Moreover, while
the drafters may be complimented on their precision, there may be advantages
to some statutory confusion. The [WpHG’s] exacting description of inside
information, for example, permits trading on anything other than actual facts.”
Finally, Standen points out that insider-trading regulation occurred in Germany
due to outside pressure rather than internally driven forces. How effective a law
can be under these circumstances, therefore, remains to be seen.
Even the BAWe itself is not content with its current authority regarding
voting rights announcements, ad hoc publicity, and insider trading, as was
revealed by BAWe President Wittich at the annual press conference in August
1999.
5 First, the BAWe would like to see the voting right notiﬁcation
requirement extended to companies listed on the secondary exchanges. Second,
the increasing number of ad-hoc disclosures from 1,272 in 1997 to 1,805 in
1998 is by itself a positive indication of increased market transparency.
However, investigating these announcements in detail reveals that an increasing
number of announcements do not contain price-relevant information but are
rather used for public relations purposes.
6 Third, even if the BAWe has the
authority to investigate insider trading, the prosecution of violations lies with
the public prosecutor’s ofﬁce. In 1998, the BAWe preformed 1,600 routine
checks of ad-hoc announcements leading to 58 more detailed insider
investigations. As Table 4, Panel A shows, these investigations steadily
increased from 24 in 1995 to 58 in 1998. However, the majority of these have
been discontinued without penalty by public prosecutors. In 1998, 21
investigations were discontinued without penalty; 13 were discontinued with
penalty payment; and 4 were still in progress after a legal court order. In view
of this, the BAWe desires its own enforcement ability for less serious cases of
insider dealing.
Looking at the public prosecutor’s decisions in insider trading cases in more
detail reveals that they have stayed away from heavy penalties. Standen (1995)
criticized the voluntary insider trading guidelines for only allowing penalties
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Panel A: Market integrity and insider trading investigations
year BAWe Public prosecutor
new investigations concluded investigations discontinued legal court order
discontinued passed to public without penalty with penalty in progress concluded
prosecutor payment payment
1995 24 16 7 2 0 2 0
1996 59 27 17 3 1 4 0
1997 55 40 22 15 6 3 0
1998 58 21 16 21 13 4 0
Panel B: Market integrity and § 9 WpHG reporting requirements
year average daily maximum daily investigations due to violation of prospectus regulations
report volume report volume
new investigations concluded investigations
discontinued concluded with passed to
penalty payment public prosecutor
1995
1 0000 00
1996 310000 651000 0 0 0 0
1997 492000 1200000 13 5 1 0







































































Panel C: Investor protection and code of conduct
year Number of customer complaints received by the BAWe organized by type of complaint
collection of customer order billing organizational irrelevant or other




1996 18 28 24 23 2 57 11
1997 8 31 93 62 3 67 20
1998 3 69 124 52 1 51 41
Panel D: Investor protection and deposit of prospectus
year prospectus received prospectus issue not allowed investigations due to violation of prospectus regulations
publication not due to missing
allowed due to prospectus
3 new investigations concluded investigations
incompleteness
3
discontinued concluded with passed to
penalty payment public prosecutor
1995 372 20 9 0 1
1996 576 46 24 0 2
1997 522 74 23 7 0
1998 1998











































Panel E: Market Transparency and §15 WpHG ad hoc publicity – announcement content
year Number of ad hoc announcements
5
foreign issuer domestic issuers (announcement organized by content)
settlement and personnel changes in semi-annual quarterly and annual strategic multiple
takeover bids changes share capital reports interim reports accounts and company or other
dividends decisions content
1995
6 10 9 44 78 0 205 350 240 65
1996 34 10 41 80 119 59 304 174 237
1997 7 22 85 90 115 104 178 287 391
1998 51 16 55 68 200 201 350 444 471
Panel F: Market Transparency and §15 WpHG ad hoc publicity – investigations
year investigations due to violation of ad hoc publicity
new investigations concluded investigations
discontinued concluded with passed to
penalty payment public prosecutor
1995 11 2 0 0
1996 16 7 0 0
1997 9 1 1 1







































































Panel G: Market Transparency and disclosure of major shareholdings
year announcements received investigations due to violation of shareholder disclosure
initial change of new investigation concluded investigations
disclosure shareholding
discontinued concluded with passed to
penalty payment public prosecutor
1995 1084 194 74 16 0 0
1996 178 512 179 73 15 0
1997 n.a. n.a. 61 135 17 0
1998 0 605 29 49 12 0
Source: BAWe annual reports, 1995 to 1998, http://www.BAWe.de/
1 The practical implementation of the §9 WpHG reporting requirement did not come into effect until 1.1.96, thus actual reporting did not take
place in 1995.
2 For 1995 no breakdown of the complaints is available. The BAWe only states that most complaints relate to the type and extensiveness of the
information that ﬁnancial institutions require to be submitted by their customers.
3 For the years 1995 to 1997, the BAWe did not have the authority to stop an issue but could only impose penalty payments. Thus, no ﬁgures
are reported here.
4 For April 1 to December 31, 1998 only. Due to the implementation of the Drittes Finanzmarktförderungsgesetze on 1.4.98, no statistics are
available for the ﬁrst quarter of 1998.
5 The categories deﬁning the content of the ad hoc announcement change from annual report to annual report. Here, the categories based on the
English version of the 1998 annual report are used and the observations for previous years are redistributed into these categories.
6 The data regarding domestic issuers listed for 1995 are approximations derived from a graph included in the 1995 annual report. In total 991










































Eup to the amount of the gains from the trades, but the current penalties do not
always exceed this ﬁgure either. Recall that §38 WpHG establishes no
maximum ceiling on the penalty for violation of §14 WpHG and that §39
WpHG establishes maximum monetary penalties from 100,000 DM to 3
million DM for violations of reporting requirements, codes of conduct, ad-hoc
disclosure, and voting right disclosure (in particular §9, 15, 16, 21, 25, 34, 36
WpHG). Reviewing the BAWe’s press releases and annual reports reveals that
even if early convictions in 1995 involved high ﬁnes, several later ﬁnes match
more closely the size of the insider’s trading proﬁt.
Focusing on other details of Table 4 reveals further information on the
effectiveness of the BAWe in reaching its goals. As the BAWe views almost all
elements of the WpHG as being beneﬁcial by either preventing insider trading
or allowing its investigation, all activities of the BAWe are reviewed in this
table.
7
Most panels show that the number of new investigations in each year exceed
that of the concluded investigations. Panel B shows the reporting requirements
and reveals that only 11 of the 25 new investigations of 1997 and 1998 were
completed ones, leaving 56% of the investigations unresolved. Regarding Panel
D, the deposit of prospectuses, the Drittes Finanzförderungsgesetz of 1998 and
the resulting changes in the WpHG have clearly increased the power and
authority of the BAWe. The BAWe is no longer only a ‘collector’ of
prospectuses who can impose penalty payments but it can now stop the
publication of a prospectus or even stop an issue from taking place. The fact
that in 1998, the BAWe used its increased authority in 37 cases is an optimistic
sign. However, the backlog of investigations is also visible here. Of the 183
new investigations only 131 have been completed, leaving a backlog of 28%.
The ad-hoc publicity investigations reported in Panel F show the largest
backlog of 69% resulting from a total of 49 new investigations and 15
completed ones. Finally, Panel G reveals that of the 343 new investigations, 317
were completed, leaving 27% unresolved. These trends could in the long-term
result in a serious backlog in investigations and consequently inefﬁcient
enforcement of the WpHG. Furthermore, Table 4, Panel C reports on the
investor complaints regarding the code of conduct. Here, the BAWe has no
authority to support investors but can only act in public interest. As one of the
BAWe’s goals is investor protection, the investors ﬁling complaints must feel
rather disappointed by the absence of any direct response from the BAWe.
Regarding insider trading, Panel B shows that the BAWe has to review an
increasing number of reports amounting in 1998 to 855,000 daily reports.
These reports are the primary tool used by the BAWe to search for indication
of possible violation of the insider trading regulation. This approach is rather
111 Do Shareholders Value Financial Transparency? Evidence From Germanyindirect. From the BAWe’s annual reports it seems that one of the strategies to
identify insider trading is to focus on changes in the volume of trades around
ad-hoc announcements. Without knowing the identity of the trader, it is unclear
how much insider trading is actually detected.
Alternative regulatory designs, such as that in the Netherlands are more
direct. The ‘Use of Inside Information’ bill, proposed in 1996 to amend section
46 of the act on Supervision of Securities Trade (Wte) of 1995 and passed in
March 1998, provides for an improvement in the effectiveness of the ban on
insider trading in the Netherlands and – among other things – requires those
individuals deﬁned as insiders to report their transactions in the securities of
their companies. In addition to stocks and bonds, stock option awarded to or
exercised by management are also covered by the new requirements. During
the adoption process of the bill, there has been a clear shift away from
anonymous reporting – as initially proposed by the Minister of Finance – to a
disclosure of the names of the insider. All transactions by designated insiders
are registered with the Securities Board of the Netherlands (Stichting Toezicht
Effectenverkeer, STE) and freely accessible to the public via their www-site.
8
Here the STE has access to all trades by designated insiders and can directly
access whether an unlawful exploitation of insider information has taken place
by this group of investors.
9 In contrast to Germany, there is greater disclosure
in the Netherlands as the supervisory authority knows the name of the person
and the public is informed about insider trades.
Remnants of the voluntary spirit of the earlier insider trading guidelines
seem to still be present in the German system. Consider, for example, the
regulatory treatment of employee stock options. The WpHG does not establish
any speciﬁc time constraints or requirements with respect to the exercise of
these options, as is the case in the U.K. and France. As the BAWe is bound in
its activities by the WpHG, it can only suggest a certain code of conduct for
companies. The voluntary character becomes clear in the following statement
of the BAWe: “[T]he BAWe generally recommends that companies should
practice a kind of corporate disclosure which goes beyond the legal
requirements. Companies should also set out clear criteria for the exercise of
share options. This would avoid giving the impression that insider trading has
taken place from the beginning, the BAWe believes.”
10 Overall, the WpHG is a
major step forward towards reducing insider trading in Germany and ﬁrst
convictions signal a clear shift from the traditionally much more lenient
attitude. However, we still perceive weaknesses in the current practice as
discussed above. In particular, we agree with Standen’s (1995) concern that
insider regulation in Germany arose due to outside pressure and not due to
inside forces.
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Keeping the voting rights disclosure shortcomings of the WpHG in mind, Table
5 provides an overview of the current voting right structure of German
companies. As the table shows a total of 1521 blockholdings currently exist
which are associated with voting rights in excess of 5%. These voting rights are
held in 444 different companies by 1197 different blockholders. Overall, each
company has an average of 3.43 blockholders who combined control 75.80%
of the direct votes and 99.43% of the total votes. These ﬁgures clearly indicate
a highly concentrated voting right structure for German ﬁrms with minority
shareholders accounting for less than 5% of the direct votes and 1% of the total
votes.
Note that Panel A indicates that all blockholders of one company control on
average 147.66% of the total votes. This ﬁgure above 100% can be explained
by the fact that the BAWe database does not provide a clear allocation of voting
rights. Consider a situation where company A holds 80% of the direct votes in
company X and company A is 100% owned by company B. Company B will
be listed in the database with 0% direct voting right in company X but with an
additional voting right of 80% leading to a total voting right of 80%. The
cumulative voting rights in company X from both company A and B are 80%
direct votes and 160% total votes. Further, if company A is not organized in the
form of an AG, company’s B interest in company A will not be reported in the
BAWe database. Thus, it is not possible to discover the accurate voting right
structure. This ﬁnding supports Becht and Boehmer’s argument that votes are
not always attributed to their ﬁnal owners since only the ﬁrst level of owners
is usually reported.
Even more concerning is the fact that the sum of all direct voting rights can
exceed 100% per company.
11 Of the 444 companies included in the BAWe
database, 13 (3%) have cumulative direct voting rights of more than 100%
ranging from 100.14% to 299.55%. How these ﬁgures can be justiﬁed or
interpreted is unclear.
Banks play a special role as blockholders due to their dual task as
equityholder and debtholder. Panel B indicates that, of the total 1521
blockholdings, 33 different banks hold 102 blockholdings in 75 different
companies. This implies that banks account for less than 7% of the number of
blockholdings in approximately 17% of the companies.
Panel B focuses on the blockholders. Overall, 1197 blockholders are holding
direct or additional voting rights in one or several of the 444 companies. These
1197 blockholders hold 1525 voting right blocks implying an average of 1.27
blockholdings. Regarding the size of each blockholders’ voting right, panel B
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(AGs)
Panel A: Descriptive statistics by company in which voting right is held
all companies companies with banks
as blockholders
number of companies 444 75
number of blockholders per company
average 3.43 4.36
median 3.00 4.00
cumulative direct votes in percent
average across companies 72.01 67.35
median across companies 75.80 70.00
cumulative total votes in percent
average across companies 147.66 121.75
median across companies 99.43 96.40
Panel B: Descriptive statistics by blockholder
all blockholders banks only individuals only
total number of blockholders 1197 33 366
total number of blockholdings 1525 102 393
number of companies in which blocks are held
average per blockholder 1.27 3.09 1.07
median per blockholder 1.00 1.00 1.00
maximum 19.00 19.00 7.00
minimum 0.00 1.00 1.00
direct votes in percent
average size of direct vote 21.90 22.03 12.53
median size of direct vote 10.01 12.19 8.06
cumulative direct votes 32,292.15 2,209.48 5,020.58
total votes in percent
average size of total vote 42.71 37.48 32.67
median size of total vote 32.47 26.00 22.28
cumulative total votes  65887.13 3,198.92 13,205.36
Note: The descriptive statistics are derived from the voting right ﬁle published by the BAWe,
version March 15, 2000. The BAWe deﬁnes total votes as the sum of direct votes and additional
votes.
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42.71% of the total votes in each company. The leading blockholders include:
12
Deutsche Bank (19 companies), Allianz (18), Dresdner Bank (14), VIAG (13),
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank Aktiengesellschaft (12), RWE (10), VEBA,
Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft and Bayern-
werk (9 each), Commerzbank, Bayerische Landesbank Girocentrale, and Adolf
Merckle (7 each). Note that these 12 blockholders include 5 banks and 2
insurance companies but only one individual. This ﬁnding is consistent with the
fact reported in panel B that banks hold on average 3.09 voting blocks whereas
individuals hold 1.07 voting blocks. Of the 366 individuals, only 24 have
voting blocks in 2 companies and 4 have voting blocks in 3 to 7 companies.
This ﬁnding can be an indication of originally family owned ﬁrms, which are
organized as an AG and in which the family members still hold a signiﬁcant
fraction of the equity and thus voting rights.
Banks might hold more voting blocks, but they seem to control about the
same percent of the votes as all blockholders on average. Measured in direct
votes, banks control a slightly larger fraction of the votes with on average
22.03% compared to 21.90% for all blockholders. Measured in total votes,
banks control a slightly smaller fraction of the votes with on average 37.48%
compared to 42.71% for all blockholders. Similarly, banks hold 6.7% (102 of
the 1525) of the voting blocks and control 6.8% (2209.48 of 32292.15) of the
cumulative direct votes and 4.9% (3198.92 of 65887.13) of the cumulative total
votes. However, as Becht and Boehmer pointed out, these ﬁgures understate the
control of banks as proxy votes are not reported.
2.4. Chronology of Events
Whereas the discussion above provides a rather bleak assessment of the
effectiveness of the new transparency framework, the analysis that follows will
try to determine whether the market’s response to the recent changes in German
disclosure requirements and insider trading laws is similarly bleak. Before
analyzing the market’s response to the passage of the WpHG, however, we
need to identify the relevant event dates associated with the legislation. As
Table 3 shows, the law was not ofﬁcially signed until July 26, 1994, but it was
proposed as early as 1991. We searched the Lexis-Nexis European News
Sources database using several search terms to identify potential event dates.
The search terms included ‘Germany’ and each of the following: ‘insider
trading’,  ‘ﬁnancial transparency’,  ‘disclosure’,  ‘legislation’, and ‘law’. We
reviewed the results of these searches to identify event dates associated with the
initial passage of the WpHG. These event dates are summarized below.
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A commission advising the German Finance Ministry recommends establish-
ing a federal watchdog agency to comply with the EU’s Insider Trading and
Transparency Directives.
November 2, 1991
The Financial Times reports that a series of insider trading scandals during the
summer of 1991 has prompted the German Government to ‘ﬁrm-up’ its
position of favoring a central regulatory authority for the ﬁnancial services
industry.
December 20, 1991
The Financial Times reports that many powerful German bankers are calling
for tougher insider trading laws. However, the Financial Times also comments
that  “despite the groundswell of emotional support for a new regime in
Germany, very little thought has been given to the important details of how any
new system would work in practice.”
January 16, 1992
The German government proposes a package of measures designed to make
insider trading punishable by imprisonment and to make ﬁnancial markets
more transparent.
January 20, 1992
Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany pledges his support for the proposed
legislation.
January 20, 1993
The Financial Times reports that a new insider trading law should be in place
by the end of 1993. This follows a year of meetings between regional ministers
to ﬁnalize the details of the proposed legislation.
June 15, 1993
The  Financial Times reports that the long-awaited regulatory agency for
German ﬁnancial markets is unlikely to be “fully operational before 1995 or
even 1996.” The Financial Times attributes the delays to disputes between
federal and state governments over the details of the legislation.
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The German Finance Committee approves the WpHG.
June 17, 1994
The lower house of the German parliament, the Bundestag, passes the WpHG.
July 8, 1994
The upper house of the German parliament passes the WpHG.
July 26, 1994
The WpHG is ofﬁcially signed into law.
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Our analysis of the share price response to the WpHG is related to a recent
study by Prevost and Wagster (1999) that investigates the 1992 change in SEC
rules that increased disclosure requirements for U. S. companies. The SEC rule
aimed to allow for more effective monitoring of management by shareholders
and a consequent reduction in agency costs. The novelty of the new SEC rule
included an introduction of shareholder approval of management compensation
and increased disclosure requirements. Prevost and Wagster show that the SEC
re-regulation was accompanied by negative stock price changes and thus
constituted wealth losses to shareholders. The authors interpret this ﬁnding to
“suggest that investors perceived these changes would expose boards to
additional pressure from groups, such as labor unions and political activists,
whose main concern is not shareholder wealth maximization . . . An
implication of this study is that as companies adopt better corporate governance
structures . . . the current level of disclosure and public justiﬁcation of
compensation policies may not be warranted.”
In contrast, Germany clearly has a different corporate governance structure
and different needs for disclosure requirements compared to the U.S.
Therefore, it is useful to investigate German shareholders’ perception of the
restrictions on insider trading and increased disclosure requirements that are
aimed at their protection and the market’s integrity and transparency.
As the discussion of Table 5 shows, the corporate governance system in
German allows for signiﬁcant control of companies by blockholders, especially
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and proxy votes given to ﬁnancial institutions by their customers, these
blockholders are often able to appoint a voting majority of the supervisory
board. The supervisory board appoints and monitors the management board,
which is responsible for the company’s operations.
Blockholder control can have both a positive and a negative effect on
shareholder wealth. Many have argued that the decisions made by blockholder-
controlled  ﬁrms are made in the blockholders’ best interests rather than
shareholders’ best interests and that blockholders might use their inﬂuence to
extract private beneﬁts at the expense of minority shareholders. Others have
argued that blockholders provide beneﬁts in the form of increased monitoring
of management. Edwards and Weichenrieder (1999) investigate the relationship
between ownership concentration and share valuation in German companies
and  ﬁnd that ownership concentration beneﬁcial. Beneﬁts for minority
shareholders can arise from greater monitoring of management by blockholders
or from a lower interest of blockholders to exploit minority shareholders.
Disadvantages of concentration arise from greater control rights of the
blockholder. Overall, the beneﬁts outweigh the disadvantages according to
Edwards and Weichenrieder.
La Porta et al. (1999) examine whether differing levels of investor protection
affect asset values in 27 countries and ﬁnd that greater investor protection leads
to higher asset values. In addition, they ﬁnd that greater equity ownership by
controlling blockholders is also associated with greater asset values. This is
consistent with the interests of a controlling blockholder becoming more
closely aligned with the interests of minority shareholders as their ownership
stake increases. When the ownership stake of a blockholder is relative low,
however, the blockholder has an incentive to collude with managers in an effort
to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders.
Given how a blockholder’s ownership stake can affect their incentives for
monitoring a ﬁrm or colluding with managers, one would expect investors to
value information about the identity and ownership stake of controlling
blockholders. If the passage of WpHG is expected to lead to German investors
becoming more informed about the identity of controlling blockholders and the
equity stake of those blockholders, then we should observe an increase in
German asset values at the time the WpHG was passed into law.
The restrictions on insider trading that were part of the WpHG should also
increase German asset values if the restrictions are viewed as reducing the costs
of insider trading and providing better investor protection. The cost of insider
trading is that some investors may demand a premium to invest in markets
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concerning the costs of insider trading.
Several authors argue that insider trading may, in fact, lead to more efﬁcient
markets. For example, Leland (1992) argues that insider trading makes markets
more efﬁcient because insider trading forces stock prices to reﬂect information
sooner. Maug (1999) argues that insider trading legislation should force
companies to disclose any information that is material. He further argues that
the insider trading legislation passed by Germany and other EU countries
deﬁnes inside information too narrowly. According to his argument, there is
some information that is relevant to ﬁnancial markets, but it is not always the
type of information that must be disclosed.
If the passage of the WpHG is viewed as improving ﬁnancial transparency,
then the share price response for banks and other ﬁnancial companies may not
be as great as the share price response for non-ﬁnancial companies. The
discussion in the previous section indicates that banks and other ﬁnancial
companies may have beneﬁted from the lack of disclosure requirements and
insider trading restrictions prior to the passage of the WpHG. Consequently, if
the WpHG is viewed as increasing ﬁnancial transparency and limiting insider
trading, then ﬁnancial companies may not experience the same gains in asset
values as non-ﬁnancial companies.
In addition to assessing how the value of German ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial
companies react to the passage, implementation, and revision of the WpHG, we
are interested in the share price response for individual companies. Speciﬁcally,
we are interested in whether ﬁrms that are subject to the greatest potential for
exploitation by controlling blockholders experience greater share price
responses than those ﬁrms that face little risk of being exploited by controlling
blockholders. Those ﬁrms that generate substantial free cash ﬂows are subject
to greater risk of exploitation by controlling blockholders, just as these ﬁrms
are subject to greater potential for agency problems. These ﬁrms should
experience a greater share price response to the WpHG if the legislation is
viewed as improving investor protections by limiting the ability of blockholder
to exploit minority shareholders. Similarly, those ﬁrms that are more difﬁcult
to monitor because of the nature of the their activities should also experience
a greater share price response if the WpHG is viewed as improving ﬁnancial
transparency. Finally, those ﬁrms with greater information asymmetries should
experience greater share price response to the WpHG if the new insider trading
and disclosure requirements are viewed as providing better information
disclosure and better investor protection. Information asymmetries are high
when insiders possess a relatively large amount of value-relevant information
about the ﬁrm that is not shared by the market.
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To investigate our hypotheses, we need stock market and ﬁnancial statement
data on German ﬁrms. We therefore start by selecting all ﬁrms listed in the
BAWe’s voting right database. This provides us with a well-deﬁned sample of
444 companies, which are listed on one of the German stock exchanges and
thus have the required stock price and ﬁnancial statement date available.
Furthermore, all of these companies are regulated by the WpHG and subject to
supervision by the BAWe.
The data needed for these companies and the data required for testing our
hypotheses are obtained from Datastream. Note that stock return data are
collected on a daily basis and that we use the total return index series (RI)
rather than stock price series to calculate returns. The German stock market
index is given by Datastream’s German market index (TOTMKBD), which is
measured in euro. In addition, we collect data on regional indices, including the
Datastream European index TOTMKEU and the Datastream World index
TOTMKWD, both measured in U. S. dollar. Daily returns for the indices are
calculated as (Indext Indext 1)/Indext 1.
Finally, two interest rate series and the German trade-weighted currency
exchange rate series (BOEDEUT) are obtained from Datastream. The interest
rate series include the German 1-month interbank offered rate (FIBOR1M) as
a short-term rate and the German 10-year government bond yield middle rate
(GRMGLTB) as a long-term rate.
For the cross-sectional analysis of how the equity values for individual
companies responded to the WpHG, company speciﬁc data is needed. In
particular, we collected daily data regarding the total return index series (RI)
for each company’s common stock measured in euro. When no common stock
data were available, preferred stock data were used. The conversions from the
total return index series to returns were calculated in the same manner as for the
German and regional market indices. In addition, we collected annual ﬁnancial
statement data measured in euro. Finally, industry sectors for each company are
identiﬁed based on the Financial Times Actuaries (INDM). Based on these
variables the independent variables for equation (3) below are derived.
Of the 444 companies listed in the BAWe voting right database, 14 are not
available at all on Datastream. In addition, many of the companies have
incomplete stock return data or missing ﬁnancial statement data during the
relevant time period. Table 6 provides summary statistics for the companies
that remain in the sample after excluding those that have incomplete data in a
given time period. The ﬁnal sample used in the analysis includes 279
companies in 1990, 294 companies in 1991, 306 companies in 1992, 313
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are nonﬁnancials. The ﬁnancial companies include banks, insurance com-
panies, and investment banks.
5. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
5.1. Valuation Effects of the WpHG
The problems we face in trying to detect valuation effects of the WpHG are
twofold. First, all ﬁrms have the same event dates. And second, it seems that the
regulation affects all listed German ﬁrms, not just a few. Other studies faced
with these problems generally address the issues in one of two ways. Some
studies look at how the regulation affects a certain industry.
13 Other studies,
especially those that examine the effects of broader regulations (those
regulations affecting all ﬁrms), select a relatively small sample of ﬁrms that are
most likely to be affected by the regulation and perform their analysis using
those ﬁrms.
14 Both of these approaches allow for using a market model of some
Table 6. Summary Statistics for Publicly Traded German AGs
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Note: This table shows the means for selected variables for the ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial
companies that have complete data available in a given year. Financial companies include banks,
insurance companies, and investment banks. Non-ﬁnancial companies include all others.
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there are any valuation effects associated with the WpHG, however, is that a
market-model approach doesn’t seem appropriate because the whole German
market is affected by the changes in disclosure requirements and insider trading
laws.
One solution to this problem is to test for valuation effects for all listed
German  ﬁrms by estimating the abnormal returns for an equally weighted
portfolio of German equities on the relevant event dates. Speciﬁcally, we
estimate the following regression:
RGt= + 1RWt+ 2EGt+ 3ISt+ 4ILt+ 
i
 iDit+e t (1)
where
RGt=the daily return on an equally weighted portfolio of German non-
ﬁnancial companies at time t or the daily return on an equally weighted
portfolio of German ﬁnancial companies at time t;
 =the intercept for the regression;
 l=the coefﬁcient measuring the sensitivity of German market returns to the
returns on the World market index;
RWt=the daily return on the World market index at time t;
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 2=the coefﬁcient measuring the sensitivity of German market returns to
changes in the German trade-weighted currency exchange rate;
EGt=the daily rate of change in the German trade-weighted currency
exchange rate;
 3=the coefﬁcient measuring the sensitivity of German market returns to
changes in the German inter-bank offer rate;
ISt=the daily rate of change on the German inter-bank offer rate;
 4=the coefﬁcient measuring the sensitivity of German market returns to
changes in the German 10-year interest rate;
ILt=the daily rate of change on the German 10-year interest rate;
 I=the coefﬁcient estimate of the abnormal return on the day of the ith
announcement and the day before the ith announcement;
Dit=a dummy variable that equals one on the day of the ith announcement
and the day before the ith announcement; zero otherwise; and
et=a random disturbance term.
This approach is similar to the approach used by Wagster (1996) and allows us
to assess the abnormal returns associated with the passage of the WpHG while
controlling for changes in global ﬁnancial market returns, German currency
values, and German interest rates. We estimate Equation (1) separately for
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the WpHG might affect banks and other ﬁnancial companies. Our test of
whether the WpHG has had any signiﬁcant impact on German asset values will
be based on the coefﬁcients associated with the event-date dummy variables.
The event dates are those listed in Section 2.4. Given that the event dates
occur over several years, however, we estimate Equation (1) separately for
1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 to allow for changes in  ,  1,  2,  3, and  4 over
time. The results of estimating equation (1) are shown in Tables 7 and 8.
Table 7 shows the results for the largest group effected by the regulatory
changes, Germany’s nonﬁnancial companies. Before interpreting the event date
coefﬁcients, it should be pointed out that, of the control variables, only the
return on the world stock index and the change in the German exchange rate
have statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. Interest rate changes do not seem to
have an impact on the stock return performance of German nonﬁnancial
companies. These results are fairly consistent across the different years.
Overall, signiﬁcant F-statistics and acceptable levels of explanatory power
indicate that the explanatory power of the model is reasonably good. Of the ten
event dates only two are signiﬁcant. The event date of January 16, 1992
represents the ﬁrst deﬁnite commitment of the German government towards
stricter insider trading laws. Whereas earlier announcements concerning efforts
to limit insider trading and improve ﬁnancial transparency were rather general
in nature and did not indicate any speciﬁc action by the German government,
the announcement on January 16, 1992 included a speciﬁc set of proposals.
Thus, the positive reaction of the stock price of German nonﬁnancial ﬁrms can
be interpreted as an indication that the market believed that the German
government was ﬁnally serious about regulating insider trading.
Given the historically lenient attitude in Germany toward insider trading, it
is not surprising that ﬁnancial markets did not react until concrete measures
were proposed. Long delays and compromises on the details of the legislation,
however, characterized the next 30 months. This is evident in the June 15, 1993
edition of the Financial Times, as discussed in Section 2.4.
Not surprisingly, when the legislation was ﬁnally approved on June 19, 1994,
the market responded negatively. The negative stock price reactions can be
interpreted as the market being ultimately disappointed about the content of the
law. Such a stock market reaction would be consistent with the evaluation of
the WpHG and BAWe given earlier in this paper: the insider trading regulations
and disclosure requirements are the most critical parts of the WpHG and have
the potential to create the most value by contributing signiﬁcantly to the
integrity of the German stock market. However, all of the regulations put in
place by the WpHG regarding insider trading, ad-hoc publicity, reporting
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ﬁnancial Companies.
Dependent variable: daily return on an equally
weighted portfolio of German non-ﬁnancial
companies in each of the years listed below·
Independent Variables 1991 1992 1993 1994
Constant
Return on the World Market Index
Changes in the German trade-weighted
currency exchange rate
Changes in the German Inter-bank Offer Rate
Changes in the German 10-year Interest Rate











































































F statistic 25.550*** 7.871*** 4.415*** 8.749***
R-square 0.398 0.136 0.073 0.193
Note: This table shows the coefﬁcient estimates (t-statistics shown in parentheses) of estimating
Equation (1).
*** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level. ** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5%
level. * indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
1 The event date dummy variables are equal to one on the event date and the day before the event date.
On all other dates, the event date dummy variables are equal to zero.
124 STEFANIE KLEIMEIER AND DAVID A. WHIDBEETable 8. Estimates of Event Date Abnormal Returns for German Banks and
Financial Companies.
Dependent variable: daily return on an equally
weighted portfolio of German nonﬁnancial
companies in each of the years listed below·
Independent Variables 1991 1992 1993 1994
Constant
Return on the World Market Index
Changes in the German trade-weighted
currency exchange rate
Changes in the German Inter-bank Offer Rate
Changes in the German 10-year Interest Rate











































































F statistic 18.966*** 6.366*** 2.106*** 6.103***
Adjusted R-square 0.326 0.110 0.025 0.136
Note: This table shows the coefﬁcient estimates (t-statistics shown in parentheses) of estimating
Equation (1).
*** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level. ** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5%
level. * indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
1 The event date dummy variables are equal to one on the event date and the day before the event date.
On all other dates, the event date dummy variables are equal to zero.
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section 2.2. The fact that we found a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
abnormal return on the date that the German Finance Committee approved the
WpHG suggests that ﬁnancial market participants assess the WpHG as being
ineffective in achieving its goals of market integrity, transparency, and investor
protection.
Table 8 shows the results of estimating Equation (1) for ﬁnancial companies.
The coefﬁcients associated with the control variables are similar to those shown
in Table 7. The results indicate no statistically signiﬁcant valuation effect for
banks and other ﬁnancial companies on any of the event dates. This is
consistent with the argument that German banks and other ﬁnancial companies
are largely unaffected by the new regulations. Standen (1995) concludes that
the “powerful german banking lobby remains largely unregulated by the new
legislation. Although obliged under an earlier draft of the law to provide their
clients with extensive disclosures as to market risks and other matters, banks
have succeeded in keeping their reporting requirements to a minimum in the
newly adopted law.”
Although not shown in Tables 7 and 8, we also investigated the subsequent
events asscociated with the BAWe as describe in Table 3. The results are not
reported here in the interest of space because they do not indicate any
signiﬁcant abnormal stock price movements.
16 We interpret this ﬁnding as an
indication that either these events were not considered value-relevant, the
market anticipated the events, or the information reached the market earlier via
other sources than the BGBl or the BAWe.
5.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis of Individual Company Valuation Effects
Given that Table 8 indicates no signiﬁcant overall valuation effect for banks and
other ﬁnancial companies, our analysis of cross-sectional differences in the
valuation effects of the WpHG is limited to nonﬁnancial companies. For the
purpose of examining the cross-sectional variation in the share price response
to the WpHG for the non-ﬁnancial companies, we use a standard market model
to estimate the abnormal returns for each individual company on each of the
signiﬁcant event dates. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following single-index
market model for the 150 trading days that end 20 days prior to each of the
signiﬁcant event dates:
Rjt= j+ jRGMt+e jt (2)
where
Rjt=the daily return on company j at time t;
126 STEFANIE KLEIMEIER AND DAVID A. WHIDBEE j=the intercept of the regression for company j;
 j=the coefﬁcient measuring the sensitivity of company j’s returns to the
returns on the German market index;
RGMt=the daily return on the German market index at time t; and
ejt=a random disturbance term.
The coefﬁcients from these regressions are used to estimate the two-day
abnormal returns on the event date and the day before the event date (t=–1 and
t=0). We estimate the two-day cumulative abnormal returns for each company
on both of the signiﬁcant event dates shown in Table 7. We then estimate the
following regression model separately for each signiﬁcant event date:
CARj= + 1LNSALESj+ 2FAj+ 3OPINCj+ 4MMERRj+e j (3)
where
CARj=the sum of the two-day (t=–1 to t=0) abnormal returns for
company j on January 16, 1992 or June 15, 1994;
LNSALESj=the natural log of sales for company j in 1991 (for the January
16, 1992 abnormal returns) or 1993 (for the June 15, 1994
abnormal returns);
FAj=the ratio of ﬁxed assets-to-total sales for company j at the end of
1991 or 1993;
OPINCj=the ratio of operating income-to-total sales for company j in
1991 or 1993;
MMERRj=the residual standard deviation in the market adjusted daily stock
returns in 1991 or 1993; and
ej=a random disturbance term.
CARj represents the cumulative impact of the WpHG on the share value of
company j. We use CARj as the dependent variable in the regression because we
are interested in determining whether the aggregate impact of the WpHG on
share values depends on ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics.
We include the log of total sales as an explanatory variable to control for any
perceived size effects in the market’s reaction to the WpHG. For example, the
costs of complying with the WpHG may place a greater burden on small ﬁrms
than on large ﬁrms. Another size effect may be due to the ownership structure
of small ﬁrms, which tend to have more concentrated ownership than large
ﬁrms. Greater ownership concentration implies that small ﬁrms are more likely
to have blockholders exceeding the 5% reporting threshold.
The ratio of ﬁxed assets-to-total sales is included in the analysis because
ﬁxed assets are easier to value and easier to monitor than other assets.
Consequently, ﬁxed assets tend to alleviate some agency problems and are less
127 Do Shareholders Value Financial Transparency? Evidence From Germanyexploitable by blockholders. If shareholders in German ﬁrms value ﬁnancial
transparency, then companies with a high proportion of ﬁxed assets-to-total
sales should experience smaller share price responses to the WpHG.
Companies with low ﬁxed assets-to-total sales ratios, on the other hand, should
experience greater share price responses as the WpHG more signiﬁcantly
improves investors’ ability to monitor these companies.
The ratio of operating income-to-total sales is included in the analysis to
determine whether differences in the level of free cash ﬂows of companies are
associated with differences in the abnormal returns associated with the WpHG.
We use the ratio of operating income-to-total assets as a proxy for free cash
ﬂow because, unfortunately, more detailed data on company free cash ﬂows are
unavailable.
The residual standard deviation in the market-adjusted daily stock returns for
the company in the year preceding the signiﬁcant event date are included in the
analysis as a proxy for the information asymmetries associated with the
company. Blackwell, Marr and Spivey (1990) argue that if insiders and
outsiders are equally well informed about market-wide factors affecting ﬁrm
value, then the residual standard deviation in the market-adjusted stock returns
will capture information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders about
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors affecting ﬁrm value.
The results of estimating Equation (3) for the January 16, 1992 and June 15,
1994 event dates are shown in Table 9. Firm characteristics do not seem to
affect abnormal returns on the January 15, 1992 event date. We attribute this
result to the fact that the details of the legislation have not been worked out at
that point in time. However, on June 15, 1994, the details of the plan were
worked out and the WpHG was passed by the German Finance Committee. The
coefﬁcient associated with residual standard deviation in the market-adjusted
daily stock returns is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that those
ﬁrms with greater information asymmetries suffered greater losses in ﬁrm value
when the WpHG was passed. This result suggests that the WpHG did not do
much to eliminate information asymmetries and may prevent insiders from
transmitting some relevant information to the market by trading on inside
information.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The primary purpose of this chapter has been to evaluate the overall
effectiveness of the WpHG in improving investor protection, market integrity,
and market transparency. Our assessment of the success of the WpHG in
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asset values reacted to announcements associated with the legislation.
Before analyzing the market’s response to the WpHG, however, we
discussed the development of the WpHG. The legislation was prompted by the
adoption of the Transparency and Insider Trading Directives by the European
Union. According to these directives, Germany should have implemented
improved disclosure requirements by the beginning of 1991 and should have
new restrictions on insider trading in place by June 1, 1992. However, the
Directives were not transposed into German Law until July 26, 1994.
Given the fact that external pressures prompted these new regulations, it is
not surprising that there were long delays in passing the WpHG. Further, it is
not surprising that the version of the WpHG that was eventually passed has
been severely criticized for being ineffective at achieving its stated goals.
Table 9. Analysis of Cross-sectional Differences in Event-date abnormal
returns.
Dependent variable: the sum of the two-day
(t=–1 to t=0) abnormal returns for each
nonﬁnancial company on the event date·
1
Independent Variables January 16, 1992 June 15, 1994
Constant
Natural log of Total Sales at the End in
Previous Year
Ratio of Fixed Assets-to-Total Sales in
Previous Year
Ratio of Operating Income-to-Total Sales
in Previous Year
Residual Standard Deviation in Market






















Number of Observations 259 275
F statistic 0.185 2.399*
Adjusted R-square –0.013 0.020
Note: This table shows the coefﬁcient estimates (t-statistics shown in parentheses) of estimating
Equation (3) for German nonﬁnancial companies. *** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%
level. ** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level. * indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the
10% level.
1 The two-day (t=–1 to t=0) abnormal returns are estimated using the market model parameters
estimated using Equation (2).
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consistent with these assessments. Market participants initially greeted the
legislation proposed by the German government with cautious optimism. This
is evidenced by the positive and marginally signiﬁcant abnormal returns on the
date the legislation was proposed. After long delays and compromises on the
details of the legislation, however, the market was ultimately disappointed. This
argument is suggested by the negative and statistically signiﬁcant abnormal
returns on the date that the German Finance Committee approved the ﬁnal
version of the WpHG. Those companies with the greatest information
asymmetries suffered the largest losses in ﬁrm value on this date, suggesting
that the WpHG failed in its stated goal of improving ﬁnancial transparency.
NOTES
1. Details are discussed in Estrada and Peña (1998) who also provide a brief
overview of insider trading regulations for 10 European countries.
2. Compare with page 21 of the 1995 annual report of the BAWe: “Eine
vergleichbare Regelung enthielt von 1987 bis 1994 das Börsengesetz in §44a alter
Fassung. Diese Vorschrift wurde jedoch nicht hinreichend beachtet.”
3. The exact name of the regulation is “Gesetz über den Wertpapierhandel und zur
Änderung börsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften” and it is part of the
Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz.
4. All information regarding the BAWe is obtained from the www-site of the BAWe
at http://www.BAWe.de/ in January 2000. In the remainder of the text, references to
speciﬁc pages of this site will only be made as an exception.
5. See press release of August 12, 1999 on “Annual Press Conference of the BAWe:
Investor protection improved, issues for the Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act”.
6. Evidence of this trend may be found in the increasing number of ad-hoc
announcement, which cannot be clearly associated with a given category. See Table 4,
panel E. The number of announcements with multiple or other has been increasing
steadily since 1995.
7. The only activity of the BAWe that is not speciﬁcally mentioned in the context of
insider trading is that of the prospectus publication and deposit. A case can, however,
be made along parallel lines to the ad-hoc publicity that any information that has been
made public cannot be mis-used for insider trading any more.
8. See http://www.ste.nl. The updates of the list with insider transactions since 1.4.99
can be found in the news section in document ‘WMZ announcements’.
9. The obvious shortcoming of this setup is that insiders can circumvent this
disclosure by allowing another person to trade on their behalf.
10. See BAWe press release “Minor little problems with share option schemes” of
November 11, 1997.
11. These ﬁgures are not included in the table.
12. The number in parentheses indicates the number of companies in which voting
rights are held.
130 STEFANIE KLEIMEIER AND DAVID A. WHIDBEE13. For example, Beatty, Chamberlain and Maglio (1996) examine security returns
for bank holding companies and insurance companies surrounding the adoption of
SFAS 115. SFAS 115 is a pronouncement on fair value accounting rules for ﬁnancial
institutions. Cornett, Rezaee, and Tehranian (1996) examine the same issue.
14. For example, Pincus (1997) examines the stock price effects of allowing LIFO
accounting for tax purposes. His sample is restricted to “ﬁrms likely to be affected by
the outcome of the LIFO legislative process more than ﬁrms in the general
population.”
15. We also estimated Equation (1) using the European market index and found very
similar results.
16. These results are available from authors upon request.
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